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I—^he ongoing fighting in Chechnya and
I Central Asia illustrates how the Russian 
JL proverb of my title (“sviato mesto pusto ne 
byvaet”) applies to the Transcaspian region. 
Central Asia and the Caucasus have become 
"sacred" battlegrounds of a new great game 
involving many states and movements. Thus the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea, a focal point of 
Transcaspian energy issues, "sits at the intersection
of the sexiest questions in international relations."1
These rivalries are not merely an East-West 
competition for energy access. Several 
simultaneous overlapping smaller games 
conducted by the local states themselves and 
neighboring political factions like Afghanistan's 
rivals for power are also occurring and involve 
geostrategy, the quest for energy access, ethnic and 
religious struggles, and outright criminality, e.g. , 
Afghanistan and Central Asia’s narcotics 
trafficking, perhaps Central Asia's most vertically 
integrated industry.2 Thus Russia declared drugs a 
national security threat in 1999 and U.S. officials 
and analysts view Central Asia as a sieve through 
which nuclear and other contraband regularly 




Any geostrategic analysis must begin with 
geography. The Transcaspian region is 
simultaneously an object and a subject of 
overlapping interstate relationships in Europe, the 
Middle East, South and East Asia. No discussion 
of its “sacredness” is complete if it ignores the 
simultaneity and breadth of its penetration by a 
much broader range of political forces than is 
presumed in conventional discussion of the new 
great game.
This region's geopolitics stretch from influence 
over economic-political outcomes in Southeastern 
Europe to membership in the OSCE and 
Partnership for Peace (PFP), the Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the 
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), to 
membership and even sponsorship of Asian 
security fora. These states participate in PEP 
programs and exercises, while Georgia and 
Azerbaijan actively seek NATO guarantees and 
even membership or alliance with NATO and 
Israel either to resolve their internal ethnic 
conflicts or to guard future pipelines.4 Georgia 
and Turkey espouse a regional security system to 
anchor the region firmly to Turkey, and through it 
to NATO, the EU, and the United States, and 
counter a perceived Russo-Greek-Armeno-Iranian 
counter-alliance against those states and
Bahrain Rajaee, “Regional Geopolitics and Legal 
Regimes: The Caspian Sea and US Policy,” International Politics, 
37, no. 1 (Mar. 2000):75.
2 This was suggested to the author by S. Frederick 
Starr, Director of Johns Hopkins’ Central Asia Institute in 
Washington, D.C., in November 1999.
3 “Outlook,” U.S. News and World Report, April 17, 
2000, p. 11; Stephen Bryen, “The New Islamic Bomb,” 
Washington Times, April 10, 2000.
4 Jan S. Adams, “The U.S.-Russian Face-off in the 
Caspian Basin, Problems of Post-Communism, 47, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 
2000):55-57; Taras Kuzio, “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: 
The Emergence of CiULJAM,” European Security, 9, no. 2 
(Summer 2000):99-l05; Svante E. Cornell, “Uzbekistan: A 
Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics?” European Security, 9, 
no. 2 (Summer 2000): 122; and conversations with Azeri 
experts in Washington and Tel Aviv (1999).
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Azerbaijan.’ Romania and Bulgaria also seek entry 
into regional energy and security agendas, further 
complicating evolving security relationships.5 6
While NATO has shunned this commitment, 
this lineup of states on both sides illustrates the 
interpenetration or convergence of different 
regional security systems here. And that process 
goes far beyond Europe. The mention of Israel 
and of Iran in these prospective blocs 
demonstrates Middle Eastern involvement in this 
sweepstakes and how the former Soviet republics 
have become part of the “New Middle East.” 
Politicians everywhere grasp this fact. Moscow's 
Joint Communique with Egypt (September 1997) 
stated:
Security and stability in the European continent are 
organically linked to security in the Mediterranean, the 
Near East, and other adjacent regions, including the 
Black Sea. Guidelines and practical activities designed 
to ensure security and stability in one region must be 
supplemented with measures to achieve the same tiling 
in other regions.The CIS is an important factor of 
stability and development in Eurasia and the world as a 
whole.7
Thus the Transcapsian’s importance derives 
equally from geography and from energy sources. 
U.S. policy is not just about energy access, but is 
geostrategic in its own right. Such reasoning 
probably applies to the other powers involved 
given their proximity' to the region.8
The southern CIS connects Russia and the 
Middle East and more generally Europe and Asia 
and is the medium through which any state or 
region projects power and influence in the other 
region. These geopolitical facts retain an enduring 
significance. The expectation and construction of 
major infrastructural and communications 
projects, like the EU's Silk Road project, have 
already promoted an accelerating and deepening 
transformation of Transcaspian relationships with 
foreign states, not just neighbors.9 * These 
transformations will surely enhance these areas' 
importance as a medium through which foreign 
governments project power and influence into 
other zones, thereby increasing the already large 
number of foreign interactions of Transcaspian 
states and adding to regional rivalries.111 Therefore 
the following terms accurately capture this region’s 
strategic location between contending major and 
smaller powers, its strategic fragmentation and 
local governments’ difficulties in creating any 
overall unifying framework, and the rivalry' not just 
among all the the great powers who aspire to play 
a major regional role here.
First of all, the Caucasus (i.e., the North 
Caucasus part of the Russian Federation and the 
Transcaucasian states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia) and Central Asia comprise a shatterbelt 
or shatterbelt zone, i.e., “strategically oriented 
regions that are politically fragmented areas of 
competition between the continental and maritime
5 Istanbul, Slilliyet (Ankara edition), in Turkish, 
February 12, 2000; Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central 
Eurasia, henceforth FBIS SOF, February' 16, 2000; Moscow, 
Krasnaya Z.veegcia, in Russian, February' 16, 2000, FBIS SOF, 
February 16, 2000; Elkhan E. Nuriev, “Conflicts, Caspian 
Oil, and NATO, Major Pieces of the Caspian Puzzle” inGary 
K. Bertsch, et al., Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign 
Body in theCaucasus and Central Asia (NY: Routledge, 1999), 
140-51.
6 Stephen Blank, “Russian and Europe in the 
Caucasus,” European Security, 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995):630-31.
7 Moscow, Internet, Russian Federation Presidential 
Administration lElME', in Russian, September 29, 1997, FBIS 
SOF, 97-272, September 30, 1997.
8 Statement of Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador- 
at-Large, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the 
New Independent States, Before the I louse International 
Relations Committee, April 30, 1998, Turkistan Newsletter, vol.
98-2:089-o6-May-1998 (henceforth: Sestanovich, Testimony)
and the statements by Ashton Carter and John Deutch in
“Caspian Studies Program Experts Conference Report: 
Succession and Long-Term Stability in the Caspian Region,” 
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1999, 
pp. 10-12 (henceforth: Conference Report).
9 Manaz Z. Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political 
CSses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989) for the geostrategic importance of 
transportation routes in Central Asia.
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powers.”11 Continental and maritime powers are 
traditional geopolitical designations for Russia and 
the United States and/or United Kingdom 
respectively. This terminology signifies the 
persistent rivalry between these two "blocs" over 
shatterbelts like the former Ottoman empire and 
the Middle East.
Shatterbelts cannot overcome physical, 
environmental, historical, cultural, and political 
differences to form a lasting basis for unified 
political or economic action. Some parts of a 
shatterbelt may seek neutrality, others may opt for 
a tighter or looser association with a great power 
either out of strategic choice or constraint from 
the great power.12 Nevertheless, disunity' remains 
their “default option” and facilitates the larger 
foreign interventions between contending blocs or 
powers that fixes the region as a shatterbelt.
To the extent that these new states forge and 
develop political, economic, and cultural ties with 
the Middle East they will integrate with the new 
Middle East, the paradigmatic shatterbelt and the 
region most penetrated by' the interactions of great 
external powers.13 The Middle East is riven by 
internal and interstate conflicts having little to do 
with great power rivalries that predate and 
postdate the Cold War. Internal conflicts within 
and among the local states also characterize the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus the Middle East 
remains a classic shatterbelt torn by both external 
great power competition and the internal rivalries 
among regional states, powers of a second, 
regional rank.
Presently, then the only' remaining shatterbelt is die 
Middle East, and it, too, is in transition. The Middle
Mackubin Thomas Owens, “In Defense of 
Classical Geopolitics,” Naval War College Review, 52, no. 4 
(Autumn 1999): 69, quoted from Saul B. Cohen, Geography 
and Politics in a World Divided, 2d ed. (NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1973), 86-87; and Rajaee, p. 78, quoted from 
“Geopolitics in the New World Era,” in George Demko and 
William Wood (eds.), Reordering the World: Geopolitical 
Perspectives on the 21“ Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 
34.
12 Ibidem.
13 M. E. Ahari, The New Great Game in Muslim
Central Asia, McNair Paper, no. 47, Institute for National
Security' Studies, National Defense University’, Washington,
D.C., 1996, pp. 45-50.
East is tilting toward the maritime [Rimland] realm, as 
the former Soviet Union has suddenly' ceased to be a 
major economic and military' supplier, at least for the 
time being. Nonetheless, Russia remains sensitive to 
the future strategic orientation of the new Caucasus and 
Central Asian states and especially' to the roles of 
Turkey' and Iran. [...] The Middle East is also a 
shatterbelt because it is so highly' fragmented. The 
region contains six regional powers—Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Syria, and Turkey—which in turn, cast their 
shadows over smaller states or separate groups within 
those states.14 * *
Transcaspian states, along with India, Pakistan, 
and China, all function in the Transcaspian 
context exactly as geostrategists would expect. 
These states,
Are emerging cores within their regions. They' have 
nodal characteristics in terms of trade and 
transportation as well as military' influence, and they' 
aspire to regional or subregional influence. Limited 
extraregional economic or political ties are also 
characteristic of such powers. Finally, though often 
overshadowed by a great power, second-order states try' 
to avoid satellite status, sometimes by' play'ing off one 
major power against the other.1’
Consequently, the Transcaspian states or 
territories are also typical buffer states. They are 
situated between two or more conflicting spheres 
of influence and they mainly separate the 
conflicting sides. Buffer states could comprise a 
rather large zone of territory, as in this case. But 
what determines their status is their "vicinal 
location", i.e., their location near neighboring 
"spheres of influence.” Here these buffer states' 
primary' characteristic is the presence of 
strategically important transportation routes. The 
presence of such routes, e.g., pipelines, ensures 
the buffer zone's importance to its neighbors and 
virtually guarantees that all rivals will strive for 
decisive influence over those routes or at least to
14 Cohen, p. 32, in Demko and Wood, as quoted 
by Rajaee, p. 78.
15 Cohen, p. 26, in Demko and Wood, as quoted 
by Rajaee, p. 78.
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prevent others from gaining decisive control over 
them.16
Consequently, because the Transcaspian region 
adjoins all their spheres of influence, the great 
powers and second-order powers contend for 
influence. And for every effort at cooperation like 
GUUAM, an organization comprising Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Azerbaijan 
established to counter Russian pressure upon 
those states, there arises other countervailing 
trends. Examples of those countervailing trends 
are Russia and China's use of terrorist threats to 
initiate their own effort at military-police 
integration of the area around Russia, or the 
Russo-Armenian alliance, or the Russo-Iranian 
strategic partnership, or the Russo-Chinese 
partnership to which Central Asian issues certainly 
contribute. Indeed, Moscow has used the terrorist 
threat to attenuate Uzbekistan's adherence to the 
GUUAM organization and weaken GUUAM’s 
ability to serve as a counter security system in the 
CIS.17
Finally the Transcaspian has also become or 
can be viewed as a security complex. As this 
term’s originator, Barry Buzan, defines it, a 
security complex denotes “a set of states whose 
major security perceptions and concerns are so 
interlinked that their national security problems 
cannot reasonably be analyzed apart form one 
another.”18 Whether these security concerns are 
those of amity or enmity, the intensity of these 
states' interactions with each other is much greater 
than are their relations with states outside the
16 As we saw in 1999 and 2000, there are enormous 
and ongoing opportunities for internal inter-state conflict 
throughout the Transcaucasus, north Caucasus, and Central 
Asia.
17 Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia: joint Military 
Exercise Practices Common Defense,” Radio Free 
Europe/ Radio Liberty, March 29, 2000, The Monitor, October 
19, 2000, The Fortnight in Review, 6, no. 20, October 20, 2000.
18 Barry Buzan, “The Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific 
Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation?” in Andrew Mack 
and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Cooperation: BuildingEconomic 
and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1995), 130-38. Interestingly, Russian writers also use 
this term, as quoted by C. W. Blandy, Chechnya: Two Federal 
Interventions and Interim Comparison and Assessment, Conflict 
Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhusrt, Camberley, Surrey, 
2000, pp. 8-9.
complex. But this complex is, in his words, 
“overlaid” with the external great and small power 
rivalries around and inside the Transcaspian. 
These patterns of “overlay” suppress or distort 
indigenous trends and processes of formation of 
relationships among Transcaspian states.19 Since 
the Transcaspian is simultaneously conceivable as 
a shatterbelt, buffer zone, and security complex 
internal and external crises are everywhere 
inextricable. While internal structurally-derived 
crises may be the most threatening ones to these 
governments, those crises cannot be confronted 
analytically or in political reality apart from the 
regional and global dynamics of the regional 
rivalries for influence.20
Because of the large number of external forces 
the minimum needs of all concerned parties are or 
should be that no one foreign power dominate 
the Transcaspian. This outcome should satisfy 
their minimum, if not greater, interests while 
addressing the local states' urgent and legitimate 
needs. Then this area would be nobody's sphere 
of influence and become instead "a zone of free 
competition."21 Despite the multifarious internal 
trends that could destabilize this area, none of the 
major contenders, Russia, China, and the United 
States is ready to accept this. Therefore smaller 
contenders like Pakistan and Iran, Israel, India, 
and Saudi Arabia will not do so either. Indeed, 
Washington ultimately aims to transform it from a 
shatterbelt into part of the West’s pluralistic 
security community.22 Since that threatens many 
other states’ interests this region remains a 
contested one.
The Transcaspian states confront multiple and 
parallel internal challenges that could serve as the 
basis or pretexts for larger international crises and
Buzan, 130-38.
20 Mohammad Ayob, “From Regional System to 
Regional Society: Exploring Key Variables in the 
Construction of Regional Order,” Australian journal of 
International Affairs, 53, no. 3 (1999):247-60.
S. Frederick Starr, “The Security Environment 
of Central Asia,” Emirates Lecture Series, no. 22, Emirates 
Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, 1999, 
p. 24.
22 For the classic definition of such communities, 
sec Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
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are constant causes of instability.23 Those 
challenges to security permit foreign intervention 
which then generally triggers a counter movement 
by another interested state or states. Thus in 1999 
a wave of kidnappings in Kyrgyzstan by Afghan- 
trained guerillas illustrated Kyrgyzstan's inability to 
defend itself and triggered a Russian and Chinese 
countermove to integrate Central Asian militaries 
and police forces against the threat of terrorism 
and separatism.24 25While such examples highlight 
linkages between domestic and foreign threats to 
these states; they also highlight the complexity of 
factors that lead states to fill up this sacred space.
The Perspectives of the Local and 
Foreign Powers
Given this context, and their own youth, the 
new states’ main objective is to consolidate their 
integrity, independence, and sovereignty by 
diversifying their foreign and defense policies. 
Therefore, they have welcomed every government 
that wishes to participate in the region, not just 
Russia and the United States/NATO. Turkey, on 
its own and as Washington's staunch ally, plays a 
major role throughout the area. Indeed, Turkish 
military and political officials now call Turkey a 
Caucasian state.23 Similarly, Iran, China, Pakistan, 
and increasingly India are all active here and are 
expected to become still more active. Indeed, 
Pakistan has announced its intention to support 
Azerbaijan militarily, thereby adding to India’s 
anxieties about Baku’s support for Pakistan.26 
Japan and to a lesser degree South Korea have 
measurable interests in the region's oil and natural 
gas supplies. Israel, either alone or apparently with 
Turkey, plays a very visible regional role. And 
Saudi Arabia is also active, mainly through its
support for Wahabbite Muslim religious 
establishments. The EU has launched an 
ambitious program to tie Europe to Asia through 
a transportation corridor that penetrates virtually 
all the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, the 
TRACECA or Silk Road project. And Balkan and 
East European states—notably Greece, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, and Poland—also 
show considerable interest in regional 
developments. More recendy Kazakstan and 
Lithuania started discussing the export of Kazak 
energy supplies through Lithuania's port at 
Ventspils to bypass Russia's monopoly over 
pipelines and ports.
All these relationships illustrate how the local 
oil and gas producers must diversify their 
relationships with as many willing partners as 
possible to retain as much independence and 
sovereignty as possible. And that means 
diversifying the routes by which their energy 
products get to market. Otherwise, they will 
remain Russia's economic satellites' as the only 
existing pipeline network was built by the Soviet 
Union to maximize Russian and central control. 
Lastly the local governments themselves 
continually seek ways to balance Russian 
pressures, e.g. GUUAM's discussions on security 
and guarding pipelines.27
For Moscow our title proverb also denotes its 
attitude to the region. Essentially Moscow insists 
this its influence alone must fill this region. 
Countless Russian statements since 1992 insist 
that this is a sphere of exclusively Russian 
interests.28 Otherwise Russia will be marginalized 
and this area will revert to the influence of alien 
and hostile powers that threaten Russia's very 
survival.29 This quintessentially Leninist, if not 
tsarist, outlook epitomizes the most hard-boiled
"3 Boris Rumcr, “In Search of Stability,” Harvard 
internationalReview, 22, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2000):44-49.
24 Pannier. Of course, by 2000 the guerillas 
operating in Central Asia and Afghanistan had become the 
cause of a major international crisis.
25 “Our Aim Is to Strengthen the Turkish Armed 
b'orces by Modernisation,” Interview with I I. E. Mr. S. 
Cakmakoglu, Turkish Minister of Defence, Nava!Fortes, no. 6 
(1999):35.
26 Moscow, Kommersant, in Russian, June 14, 2000,
FBIS SOV, June 14, 2000; Baku, Agadlyg in Azeri, June 14,
2000, FBIS SO V, June 14, 2000.
27 Pannier, The Fortnight in Review, October 20,
2000, The Monitor, October 19, 2000, FBIS SOV, February 16, 
2000. For a sign of the geostrategic importance of the 
TRASECA or Silk Road project, see Leila Alieva, Reshaping 
Eurasia: Foreign Policy Strategies and leadership Assets in Post-Soviet 
South Caucasus, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet 
Studies, Working Paper Series, Winter 2000, pp. 19-20.
28 Dov Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the 
CIS: The Cases of Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan (NY: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000) is replete with such statements.
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theory of realism in international relations that 
sees those relations in terms of zero-sum games, 
the artificiality of small states’ sovereignties, and 
Russia as a power threatened on all sides by 
powers who seek to take its territory or 
marginalize it.30
Therefore, Russia views all foreign penetration 
of the Transcaspian with alarm and reacts 
increasingly sharply to threats, real or imagined, 
and its media is saturated with articles depicting 
NATO enlargement, the formation of the 
GUUAM, and NATO's campaign in the Balkans 
as serial threats. For the General Staff, the 
message was already clear in 1998. Russia had to 
reply to these threats by force.31 As Russia's 
conception of the state remains an imperial one 
wedded to notions of a zero-sum game and the 
tsarist-derived belief that empire and state are 
coterminous and if there is no empire, there is no 
state, the resort to force is not surprising.
President Vladimir Putin and leading military 
officials have repeatedly invoked the domino 
theory towards Chechnya and the need to crush it 
by force because this threat was an international 
one sponsored by a kind of Muslim terrorist 
international.32 But the decision to go to war 
against Chechnya was also a signal to NATO and 
Washington of a resolve to fight local wars, if 
necessary, to defend Russia's position in the 
Caucasus. The General Staffs 1998 threat 
assessment saw Kosovo and Chechnya as two 
sides of the same coin and tied Kosovo to 
Chechnya even before NATO actually went to 
war in Kosovo. This assessment lambasted 
NATO in November 1998 for desiring to act 
unilaterally out of area and impose a new world 
order by bypassing the UN and OSCE. It accused 
NATO and specifically the United States of going 
beyond the Washington Treaty and convert 
NATO into an offensive military bloc that was
30 For example, Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the 
National Question: Selected Writings and Speeches (NY: 
International Publishers, 1942), 77.
31 Moscow, Ne^avisimoe Voennoe Obocreme, in 
Russian, November 6-12, 1998, FBIS SOW November 9, 
1998).
" Moscow, Vek (electronic version), in Russian, 
November 26, 1999, FBIS SOW, November 29, 1999.
expanding its “zone of responsibility” by punitive, 
military means.33 Its authors charged:
At the same time, it is not unlikely that NATO could 
use or even organize crises similar to that in Kosovo in 
other areas of the world to create an excuse for military 
intervention since the “policy of double standards” 
where the bloc’s interests dictate the thrust of policy 
(the possibility of the use of military force in Kosovo 
against the Yugoslav Army and simultaneous disregard 
for the problem of the genocide faced by the Kurds in 
Turkey, the manifestation of “concern” at the use of 
military force in the Dniester Region, Chechnya, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh) is typical of the alliance’s actions.34
The authors went beyond hinting at renewed 
fighting in Chechnya to warn NATO openly about 
Russia’s likely reaction to an operation against 
Serbia. Rather than accept a NATO-dictated 
isolation from European security agendas and the 
negating of organizations like the UN and OSCE, 
Russia would act since this crisis offered NATO 
an opportunity' to project military force not just 
against Serbia but against Russia itself. Since 
NATO enlargement's main goal was to weaken 
Russian influence in Europe and globally the 
following scenario was likely. “Once our country 
has coped with its difficulties, there will be a firm 
NATO ring around it, which will enable the West 
to apply effective economic, political, and possibly 
even military pressure on Moscow.”33 Specifically,
When analyzing the development of events in the 
Balkans, parallels with the development of events in the 
Caucasus involuntarily suggest themselves: Bosnia- 
I-Ierzegovina is Nagorno-Karabakh; Kosovo is 
Chechnya. As soon as the West and, in particular, 
NATO, has rehearsed the “divide and rule” principle in 
the Balkans under cover of peacekeeping, they should 
be expected to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
CIS countries and Russia. It is possible to extrapolate 
the implementation of “peacekeeping operations” in 
the region involving military force without a UN 
Security Council mandate, which could result in the 
Caucasus being wrested from Russia (it bears 
mentioning that this applies as well to the independent 
states of the Transcaucasus an involuntary hint of the




continuing neo-imperial mindset of the General Staff- 
author) and the lasting consolidation of NATO’s 
military presence in this region, which is far removed 
from die alliance’s zone of responsibility. Is Russia 
prepared for the development of diis scenario? It is 
obvious that, in order to ensure diat die Caucasus does 
not become an arena for NATO Allied Armed Forces’ 
military intervention, the Russian Government must 
implement a well defined tough policy in the Balkans, 
guided by die UN charter and at die same time 
defending its national interests in die region by 
identifying and providing the appropriate support for 
this policy’s allies.36
The U.S. view is equally geostrategic and 
regards access to energy not just as an economic 
benefit, but strategically. Former high-ranking 
members of the Clinton Administration state that 
even if Caspian energy will not equal Saudi 
holdings, it will be a significant though not 
determinative factor in global energy. But Caspian 
energy is crucial to the security and stability of the 
new states, which is “a vital American interest.”37 
They are a vital U.S. interest because of the 
Transcaspian states' proximity to Russia, Iran, 
Turkey, and China. Their independence 
constitutes a bulwark against Russian neo­
imperialism and a check upon Iranian pretensions 
to Pan-Islamic anti-Westernism in the Muslim 
world.38
Therefore, Washington must support these 
states' independence, develop bilateral regional 
security relationships, forge relationships between 
the Partnership for Peace and these states, and 
create a win-win energy policy based upon 
multiple pipelines so that no one power dominates 
the region or excludes anyone else, allowing all 
these states to share equally in the energy wealth.39 
This means breaking Russia's monopohstic policy, 
multiple pipelines and the creation of stable 
conditions that would permit the enormous 
foreign investments needed to bring energy on 
line.40
37 Conference Report, 10-12.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
NATO's and Washington's increasing presence 
dates from 1994-95 and aimed to counter the 
threat of a Russian-directed coercive economic- 
political-military reintegration of the CIS.41 Since 
that time Washington has launched a 
comprehensive economic, political, and military 
program to integrate these states with the West in 
all these domains, and preserve multiple energy 
pipelines, the new states' independence and 
freedom from any rivals' sphere of influence.42 
U.S. officials view this area as an alternative or 
backup to the Middle East, whose volatility 
constantly threatened energy prices, Western 
economies, and great power relationships.43 By 
1995 crucial decisions to keep Russia from 
monopolizing the region's energy holdings had 
been made. In February 1995 Washington 
decided to support pipelines running through 
Turkey and not Russia., to break Russia's grip on 
Central Asia's oil export, help ensure the survival 
of independent states in the region, and protect 
U.S. corporate interests.
Consequently, Washington has increasingly 
become the arbiter of interstate energy issues in 
the CIS, excluding and rivaling Russia. U.S. 
officials and diplomats relentlessly pursue a 
pipeline from Central Asia through the Caspian 
Sea, Baku, and Georgia to Ceyhan, Turkey, which 
excludes Russia and Iran (even in the face of 
compelling economic logic).44 * * *Complementing the
41 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “US Policy and the 
Caucasus,” Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter, Berkeley Program 
in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, issue 5, Spring 1998, pp. 3- 
4.
42 Stephen Blank, U.S. Militay Engagement with 
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic 
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2000).
43 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, Strategic
Geography and the Changing Middle East (Washington, 
D.CcCarnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 
xiii; “Introduction,” Robert D. Blackwill and Michael
Stuermer (eds.), Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the
Greater Middle East (Cambridge: MIT University Press, 1997), 
2.
4 Laurent Ruseckas, “US Policy and Caspian 
Pipeline Politics: The Two Faces of Baku-Ceyhan,” Caspian 
Studies Program Experts Conference Report: Succession and 
Long-Term Stability' in the Caspian Region, Strengthening 
Democratic Institutions Project, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University', 1999, pp. 119-22.
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focus on energy issues is Washington’s leading 
role in international financial institutions who play 
a large role in channeling foreign resources to 
Central Asia. All these activities also contradict the 
U.S.’ stated intention that NATO enlargement and 
associated trends would not further embroil it in 
all kinds of local issues. Instead, Washington is 
the main center of international adjudication of 
many regional issues.
The Defense Department has discussed 
strengthening military cooperation with 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan and training 
Azerbaijan’s army, thereby alarming Armenia and 
Russia.4’ The Pentagon allocated areas of 
responsibility (AORs) to U.S. commands for the 
Transcaspian. In September 1995, U.S. experts on 
Central Asia cited Washington's extensive interests 
in Caspian energy as a reason for possibly 
extending U.S. Persian Gulf security guarantees 
here.46 Indeed, it seems that the Caspian 
exemplifies the "unipolar moment where 
Washington can construct and maintain a 
convivial alignment of international forces. 
Implicitly it drinks that it can constrain Russian 
policy here with few or no seriously negative 
consequences."47
U.S. writers increasingly call this area part of 
the “greater Middle East,” the “strategic fulcrum 
of the future,” or the “strategic high ground,” due
45 Moscow, Ne^avisimaya Gas^eta, in Russian, 
September 13, 1997, Foreign Broadcast Information Sendee,
Military Affairs (henceforth FBIS UA-IA), 97-259, September 
16, 1997, R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Leads Peacekeeping Drill in 
Kazakstan,” Washington Post, September 15, 1997, p. 17; 
Charles Clover and Bruce Clark, “Oil Politics Trouble Central 
Asian Waters,” Financial Times, September 23, 1997, p. 9.
46 “If We Clash It’ll Be on the Caspian,” Current 
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (henceforth CDPP), 27, no. 21, 
June 21, 1995, p. 21; Dmitri Vertkin, Kazakhstan Security and 
the New Asian Landscape, BailriggPaper, no. 26, Centre for 
Defence and International Security Studies, Lancaster 
University, 1997, pp. 17-18; Robin Morgan and David 
Ottaway, “Drilling for Influence in Russia’s Back Yard,” 
Washington Post, September 22, 1997, pp. Al, 15.
47 Douglas Blum, “Sustainable Development and 
the New Oil Boom: Comparative and Competitive Outcomes 
in the Caspain Sea,” Program on New Approaches to 
Russian Security, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard 
University, Working Paper Scries, no. 4, 1997, p. 21.
to its energy resources.48 The strategic rationale 
for American involvement in the Transcaspian’s 
defense and security relations stem from today's 
new geostrategic situation. “The main reason why 
the West cannot remain complacent about 
Russia’s actions is the fact that Russia’s ‘near 
abroad’ is, in many cases, also democratic 
Europe’s near abroad.”49 50However, Washington 
could relatively easily be drawn into local ethnic 
conflicts either as peacemaker or peacekeeper. 
This would accord with the Georgian and Azeri 
demands noted above for NATO involvement 
and commitment to their states' interests. The 
alliance that these states seek with Turkey could 
indirectly bring the NATO and/or the EU into 
the fray. If this intervention came to resemble the 
Kosovo campaign it would trigger Russia's worst 
nightmare with unforeseeable consequences.
Hitherto Washington has wisely eschewed 
directly committing U.S. troops to any of the 
many local conflicts, but that is not a commitment 
of principle. There are reports of U.S. willingness 
to send peacekeeping troops should the OSCE's 
Minsk process bring peace to Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Clearly American regional military involvement is 
growing. General John Sheehan (USMC), former 
CINC of the U.S. Atlantic command (ACOM) and 
NATO’s S A CL A NT (Supreme Allied 
Commander Atlantic) announced U.S. willingness 
to take part in regional peace support operations 
involving Central Asian forces under UN 
authorization, further extending Washington's 
offer of security cooperation to them.’0
The Transcaspian’s heightened importance has 
already apparently convinced many that challenges 
to regional security entail threats to our critical or 
even vital interests. U.S. militaty' analysts frankly 
state the goals of activities under the rubric of 
engagement and Partnership for Peace, as essential 
aspects of the U.S.’ strategy of “extraordinary
48 Kemp and Harkavy, xiii; Blackwill and Stuermer,
2.
49 John Roper and Peter van I lam, “Redefining 
Russia’s Role in Europe” in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed.), Russia 
and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (Oxford: Oxford 
University' Press for SIPRI, 1997), 517.




power projection.” These programs include joint 
exercises, staff visits, training, increasing 
interoperability, etc. These activities also assist 
transition to war and, if necessary, participation in 
its initial stages and perhaps even subsequent 
combat operations as well?1 NATO’s increased 
southern Mediterranean exposure can only 
increase its prominent institutional role in conflict 
prevention, security assistance, and military- 
political integration. Thus in the summer of 1999 
NATO began to unify and control the region’s air 
space, signifying eventual interest in including this 
area in its operational plans and future 
membership?2
NATO’s expanding interest reflects the 
broader process by which the CIS has entered into 
Europe's security agenda?3 This too is more than 
a question of conducting PfP programs and 
exercises in the region. Turkey’s provision of 
military training to Central Asian states and 
Azerbaijan, intention to organize a Caucasian 
peacekeeping force, and sponsorship of a new 
stability pact and system are only the most 
prominent of such examples?4 The Greco-Turkish 
rivalry in the Aegean and Balkans could have been 
projected into the Middle East and the CIS or 
exploited by Russia for its own purposes in all 
these regions and used to block American and 
Turkish goals; it is not accidental that at the 
OSCE's 1999 Istanbul conference American 
activity revolved around influencing the process of 
Greco-Turkish negotiations, winning the CIS 
members to support a pipeline through Baku to 
Turkey (Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast) and 
getting Turkey into the EU's active consideration 
for membership. Thus the old Eastern Question 
has, since 1993, reemerged as the question of the
former Soviet republics' future destiny; issues of 
European energy security and geostrategy are now 
intimately Enked to security outcomes in the 
Transcaspian?3 Turkish goals of preventing future 
Russian miEtary threats and securing its leading 
influence in a region of the world where it now 
finds new opportunities for influence since the 
end of the Cold War coincide with American and 
NATO strategy. This trend creates great 
apprehension among certain, though not all, 
sectors of Russian foreign and defense 
poEcymaking.
The Transcaspian Region and
Eurasian Regional Security Agendas
This example suggests the imbrication of 
security agendas in and around the Caspian with 
those in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 
Pakistan views the region as an essential strategic 
hinterland in its quest for security against India?6 
Meanwhile, Indian analysts differ as to whether or 
not India has invested or should invest 
considerable resources to stabiEze Central Asia 
against Pakistani designs there. But apparently 
China, Russia, and the United States each want to 
enEst India's influence in Central Asia as a 
stabiEzer against the threat of disintegrating 
regimes there. Of course, since each actor defines 
the goals and content of this stabilization 
differently and clash among themselves, the 
rivalries around Central Asia are Enked to Indo- 
Chinese tensions, Sino-American rivalries over 
Asia, and Russia’s ongoing efforts to forge 'a 
counter-American strategic triangle with India and 
China. But simultaneously the joint struggle to 
contain Afghan-based “terrorism” and insurgency 
to some degree also unites Washington and 
Moscow with Delhi?'
51 Roger W. Barnett, Extraordinary Power Projection: 
An Operational Concept for the U.S. Nan)', Strategic Research 
Development Report 5-96, U.S. Naval War College, Center 
for Naval Warfare Studies, Occasional Papers, Newport, RI, 
1996, pp. 7-8.
52 Luke 1 Iill and Brooks Tignor, “NATO Reaches 
to Caucasus,” Defence News, August 2, 1999, pp. 3, 19.
53 Blank, “Russia and Europe in the Caucasus,”
622-45.
54 Hill and Tignor, 3, 19; The Monitor, December 10, 
1998; Umit Eginsoy, “Turkish Moves in Caucasus, Balkans 
Irk Rivals in Region,” Defense News, August 3-9, 1998, p. 12.
55 Stephen Blank, “The Eastern Question Revived:
Russia and 'turkey Contend for the New Middle least,” in
David Menashri (ed.), Central Asia Meets the Middle East
(London: Frank Cass Publisheers, 1998), 168-88.
56 Stephen Blank, Energy, Economics, and Security in
Central Asia: Russia and Its RJvals (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1995), 23-26.
57 C. Raja Mohan, “Fostering Strategic Stability and 
Promoting Regional Cooperation”; Kanti Bajpai, “India-US
Foreign Policy Concerns: Cooperation and Conflict”; Igor 
Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, “Contending with the
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Consequently, Central Asia, if not the 
Caucasus, is fully integrated into the whirlpool of 
inter-Asian security agendas. Since Pakistan- and 
Afghan-inspired efforts to subvert the current 
secular governments by supporting Islamic 
insurgencies grows out of Pakistan’s wager on 
Islamic self-assertion throughout Asia and its own 
self-projection as an Islamic state and torchbearer, 
Indian involvement will probably grow?8 
Meanwhile, Central Asia is already exposed to the 
unholy trinity of Islamic and ethno-religious 
insurgencies, drugs, and civil strife. Local leaders 
must to some extent reckon with the potential for 
Central and South Asian conflicts to join with 
each other and become a factor for the possible 
escalation of Indo-Pakistani hostilities or of the 
civil wars in Tajikistan, and Afghanistan, or 
potentially new conflicts in Central Asia. Were 
any of those contingencies to occur, it is unlikely 
that Central Asia could escape either the actual or 
political fallout of a potential Indo-Pakistani 
conflict.
The Chinese Gambit
Many factors are leading China into a deeper 
and broader engagement with the Transcaspian 
region that could eventually collide with the 
interests of the other major actors there, not 
excluding Russia. Indeed, some, including this 
writer, have hypothesized that in the long term China 
might be Russia’s most stubborn rival in Central 
Asia especially if it moves forward while Russia 
continues to stagnate.’9 However, if the economic 
disparity between Beijing and Moscow continues
‘Bear-ish’ Arms Market: US-Indiana Strategic Cooperation 
and Russia”- all in Gary K. Bertsche, et al. (eds.), Engaging 
India: US Strategic Relations with the World’s Eargest Democracy 
(NY: Routledge, 1999), 26, 32-33, 38, 197-98, 245-46; 
Margaret Coker, “U.S., Russia Worry Poor Central Asia 
Threatens as Terrorist Breeding Ground,” Cox News Service, 
October 17, 2000, www.nexis.com/ research/ search / 
documentDisplay?_docnum+121 &an: 10/18/2000.
58 Blank, Energy, Economics and Security, 26-30.
59 Ibid.; Yuri Peskov, “Russia and China: Problems 
and Prospects of Cooperation with CIS Members in Centra] 
Asia,” Eastern Affairs, no. 3 (1997):9-23; Guancheng Xing, 
“China and Central Asia: Towards a New Relationship,” in 
Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (eds.), Ethnic Challenges 
Beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives off the Central Asian 
Conundrum (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 40-41.
to widen and accelerates, this rivalry' might emerge 
sooner rather than later for all the talk of bilateral 
strategic partnership. Already Russia warily limits 
China’s economic engagement in Central Asia 
whenever it can.60 For now, however, China 
supports Russia's leadership here and that support 
clearly gratifies Moscow.61
Nevertheless, China clearly seeks influence 
over the region in order to play a major, or at least 
greater, role in world politics. Chinese analyses 
highlight only some of the fundamental strategic 
issues for China’s future direction in world affairs 
that will be affected by the rivalry for energy and 
influence. Xu Xiaojie writes that China has a great 
opportunity to expand its political and economic 
position in Asia. Its involvement in the 
Transcaspian is an important component of this 
“geopolitical game.” Related issues involve U.S.-
C.hina relations regarding both governments’ 
Middle Eastern oil supplies, Sino-Russian energy 
relations, and China’s regional role in Northeast, 
Central, and Southeast Asia. Thus, “China’s 
future geopolitical priority certainly will be to 
regenerate an aggressive geostrategy that 
reestablishes a leading role in not just Asia, but the 
world scene.” 62 *
The motives for China's deepening 
Transcaspian engagement also derive from China’s 
own domestic confrontation with continuous 
unrest in Xinjiang since 1980, its most intractable 
domestic threat. China has employed several 
tactics to forestall this unrest. It has aligned itself 
with Russia, depriving CIS members of the option 
of using Russia against China or hiding behind 
Moscow’s support. Second, it has engaged all the 
Central Asian governments in cross-border
60 Shiping Bang, “Economic Integration in Central 
Asia: The Russian and Chinese Relationship,” Asian Survey, 
40, no. 2 (March-April 2000): 360-76; Philip Andrews-Speed 
and Sergei Vinogradov, “China’s Involvement in Central 
Asian Petroleum: Convergent or Divergent Interests,” Asian 
Survey, 40, no. 2 (March-April 2000):377-95.
61 “New Strategic Trends in Russo-Chinese 
Relations,” testimony of Professor Stephen J. Blank of the 
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College to 
the House Armed Services Committee, 105‘b Congress, 
Washington, D.C.,July 19, 2000.
62 Xu Xiaojie, “China Reaches Crossroads for
Strategic Choices,” World Oil, April 1997, p. 99.
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economic relationships, creating webs of 
dependence to remind them of the risks of 
upsetting Beijing. Since Shanghai is Kazakstan’s 
main port and Chinese military might is relatively 
overt, Kazakstan and its neighbors have refrained 
from supporting the insurgents in Xinjiang. At 
the same time, and as part of the greater strategy 
of seeking long-term economic influence and 
access in Central Asia, China has redirected 
investment to its backward western and 
northwestern provinces to remove discontent, 
encourage continuing Han migration into those 
areas, and drown the insurgents in a Chinese sea.63
The need for energy as domestic sources reach 
their limits and demand grows has also driven 
China to buy pipelines going from Kazakstan to 
Shanghai and to make major investments in the 
oil- and gas-bearing states, including Azerbaijan. 
Since China cannot afford dependence on just one 
source of energy and must continue its economic 
progress without interruption, domestic tranquility 
and economic progress make it imperative that 
Beijing get into Central Asia and the Transcaspian 
before others, notably the United States and Japan, 
who has shown a very strong interest in enhancing 
its regional profile and gain preeminent influence 
over regional energy supplies.
Guancheng Xing writes:
For China, a Central Asia which is capable of 
overcoming its economic difficulties and getting out of 
its economic crises has a better chance of achieving 
economic prosperity and political stability. China can 
benefit greatly from its stable and prosperous 
neighboring states. Only when Central Asian states are 
politically stable and economically prosperous can Sino- 
Central Asian economic cooperation be conducted 
effectively and smoothly. Such economic cooperation 
can and will speed up economic development in the 
Northwest of China. It can therefore be argued that to 
a large extent the stability and prosperity of Northwest 
China is closely bound up with the stability and 
prosperity of Central Asia. It is, rightly, because of this 
consideration that China advocates and promotes active 
trade and economic cooperation between China and 
Central Asian states for common economic 
prosperity.64
63 Guancheng Xing, 44-45.
64 Ibid, 35.
China’s coherent and comprehensive strategic 
vision derives from more than economic motives. 
As he also observed, in its Central Asian policies 
China pays considerable attention to the Russian 
factor. China perceives the importance of the 
Russian tie to Central Asia and seeks to 
strengthen, not disturb it, because China also sees 
Russia as a factor of regional stability.64 During 
1999 two sources contributed to this support for a 
strong Russian security presence in the area and 
for strong bilateral cooperation with Moscow as 
part of the greater Sino-Russian rapprochement.
One of these is China’s perception of a 
threatened “Asian NATO.” China discerns the 
U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance and support for Taiwan 
that constrains or contains its expanding influence. 
In Central Asia, Beijing sees the expansion of 
American and NATO military influence to the 
Transcaucasus and Central Asia as a threat to its 
and Russia's influence. Chinese writers rarely, if 
ever, miss opportunities to warn Russia of 
Washington's nefarious aims regarding Moscow. 
Central Asia and the expansion of the Partnership 
for Peace program exemplify this point.65 6
But this support for Russia's position is 
conditional upon Russia's military not becoming a 
threat to China.67 Therefore, barbarians should be 
induced to fight barbarians, i.e, Russia clash with 
NATO. If Russia aligned with NATO, despite 
countless Chinese warnings, support for Russia's 
position in Central (and other parts of) Asia would 
disappear. Thus Chinese warnings about NATO’s 
actions and threats are not surprising. Meanwhile, 
China's true attitude towards NATO enlargement 
is much less hysterical and more cold-blooded.68
Thus China supports Central Asian military 
alignment with Russia because this removes many 
of its anxieties about Central Asian support for 
Xinjiang's Muslims or about disputed territories.
65 Ibid, 40-41.
66 Ibid, 39-40. Michael Pillsbury, China Debales the 
'Future Security Environment (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 2000), passim.
67 Guancheng Xing, 40-41, and idem, “Security 
Issues in China’s Relations with Central Asian States,” in 
Zhang and Azizian (eds.), 215.
68 Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “Comrades No More: Sino- 
Central European Relations After the Cold War,” Problems of 
Post-Communism, 46, no. 2 (March-April 1999), 9-10.
/7
THE HARRIMAN REVIEW
In 1999 the assassination attempts against Uzbek 
President Karimov, Islamic insurgencies in 
Kyrgyzstan supported by Afghan and Pakistani 
forces, the Chechen war, and the disturbed 
situation whereby Central Asian governments now 
seem disposed to discern new anti-government 
plots greatly alarmed Moscow, Beijing, and local 
governments and stimulated Russo-Chinese 
moves for renewed cooperation against 
“terrorism.” Moscow hopes to use these activities 
as a lever to promote rejuvenated military 
integration of Central Asia with Russia and firmer 
Sino-Russian military-political cooperation to put 
Central Asia “on ice.” This cooperation goes 
beyond the five power border treaty of 1996 
which adjusted all borders between Central Asia 
and China and between Russia and China and the 
regular meetings of high-level officials from all 
states. This anti-terrorist coalition clearly has 
broader strategic aims than simply stabilizing the 
status quo in Central Asia.69
China is also stepping up its visibility' in the 
Caucasus. In 1999 it was caught selling missiles to 
Armenia. Azerbaijan’s strong protests ultimately 
forced Beijing to apologize, much as it had done 
to the United States with regard to Pakistani 
nuclear projects, and claim this will not happen 
again. More likely, however, as in Pakistan, there 
will be more such examples. Perhaps China did so 
at the behest of Armenia and Russia. The Sino- 
Russian strategic cooperative partnership gives 
every sign of developing into a broader strategic 
coordination between the two governments. 
Russia and Armenia may' have asked China to 
make the sale to spare Russia from complications 
with Azerbaijan due to its earlier transfer of a 
billion dollars worth of weapons to Armenia 
which raised a great deal of trouble for Russia in 
its domestic politics and even more with Baku. As 
Azeri-based oil was about to come on stream and 
negotiations for a final decision on the routes or 
pipelines through which that oil would flow were 
about to begin, China seemed an appropriate 
conduit.
A second explanation that does not contradict 
this first one is that this sale coincided with 
China's desire to establish a foothold in the area,
although it is still unclear why Beijing would go 
out of its way' to antagonize a potential source of 
oil and gas. A third possibility is that the 
“princes,” members of the families of China’s 
ruling elites, who control arms sales can to some 
degree act on their own in such matters. While we 
cannot know the reason for this sale for certain, it 
signifies China’s deepening military' involvement 
with the Transcaspian. China is not only' upgrading 
its trade and economic relations with Central Asia, 
it is also buying into energy' fields and pipelines to 
stake its claim to leverage over those assets, 
pursuing influence in Central Asia, guaranteeing its 
own energy sufficiency in the face of rising 
demand, and suppressing domestic insurgency by 
a subtle policy tying domestic and foreign security' 
policies. China is moving to fulfill Xu Xiaojie’s 
blueprint and win an established role as a key' 
player here.'11
As Central Asia's destiny' may be increasingly' 
linked with that of East and/or South Asia the 
ultimate strategic implications of that trend remain 
undefined. But we can safely assert that Beijing is 
not only determined to have an enduring voice in 
the final disposition of the Transcaspian as a 
strategic region, but has also begun to act on that 
determination.
The Middle East
Similar prospects are visible in the Middle East. 
As Azeri efforts to involve Israel and Turkey' in an 
alliance system against Moscow, Athens, and 
Tehran suggest, regional alignments here can spill 
over into Middle Eastern alignments or vice versa 
and involve rivals in one “theater” in conflicts in 
the second theater. Even if we consider the new 
states as part of the new Middle East, they' clearly 
bring a different baggage and agenda into Middle 
Eastern politics. Their generally good relations 
with Israel stem from the practical needs that 
Israel can satisfy'. Israel has valuable economic 
and domestic development experience and 
capabilities, most notably with regard to the 
pressing water problems that afflict Central Asia. 
Good relations with Israel also open doors in 
Washington. Israeli military' assistance may' also be
69 Blank, Testimony. 70 Xu Xiaojic, 99.
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highly regarded, especially as all these states share 
enmity with fundamentalist Islamic forces. Those 
governments who suspect Iran's ultimate 
intentions also might be inclined to gravitate to 
Iran's strongest rival in the Middle East. 
Moreover, as the Central Asian governments are 
all anti-fundamentalist (i.e., against the 
politicization of Islam) they reject Iran's periodic 
calls for a more Islamic foreign policy. As Iran 
has all but signed an alliance with Christian 
Armenia against Azerbaijan, these states see Iran’s 
self-interest in such calls.
Nevertheless, Iran has been remarkably 
circumspect here, relying since 1999 primarily on 
economic ties to win influence. Iran has 
periodically offered its infrastructure and whatever 
economic benefits it can provide to Central Asian 
energy producers. But on the key issues of 
pipelines and the legal character of the Caspian 
Sea it has firmly supported Russia against 
Washington, Azerbaijan, and Kazakstan. Tehran 
aims to stifle Azerbaijani irredentism concerning 
the large Azeri minority in Northern Iran, and not 
to antagonize Russia, its main military benefactor, 
while Washington resolutely seeks to isolate it. 
Indeed, Russian support for Iranian nuclearization 
stems not just from its defense and nuclear 
industries' desperate need for revenues, but also 
from the well-founded belief that if it does not 
provide military assistance, Iran could create many 
difficulties for Russia here. This realization dates 
from February 1992, i.e., the founding days of 
Russian statehood.71
While Iranian media remain very troubled 
about the war in Chechnya, official Iran remains 
on Russia's side in this conflict, at least publicly.72 
This strategic marriage of convenience shows how 
strategic factors in the CIS affect one of the oldest 
and most solidly established relations in the 
Middle East, namely the Russo-Iranian
71 Stephen Blank, “Russia and Iran in a New 
Middle East,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 3, no. 4 (ball 1992): 124- 
27.
72 Tehran, Iran, in English, bcbruary 20, 2000, 
Foreign Broadcast Information Sendee, Near East and South Asia, 
(henceforth FBIS NES), February 20, 2000; Robert O. 
Freedman, “Russian-Iranian Relations Under Yeltsin,” Paper 
presented at the Sixth Annual ASN Convention, Columbia 
University, April 14, 2000.
relationship, helping convert it from one of almost 
unceasing conflict and mutual suspicion into a 
lively and developing amity and strategic 
partnership.
On the other hand, Iran is currently 
undergoing a struggle between moderates and 
more hardline elements. This struggle clearly 
revolves in some measure around Iranian attitudes 
towards the United States and its desperate 
economic weakness. If the moderates and 
exponents of an economic rationale for policy and 
rapprochement with Washington prevail, 
Washington will reciprocate by expanding support 
for diverse pipelines to include Iran, the most 
economically rational option in the pipeline 
equation. That would trigger a major and 
profoundly consequential geopolitical shift in 
Iranian policy away from support for Russia and 
China whose regional implications could equal 
those of Iran’s 1979 revolution.
Iranian Nuclearization and the 
Transcaspian Region
However, perhaps the most unpredictable risk 
factors facing the entire area are the consequences 
of Iran’s impending nuclear capability. U.S. 
military and political authorities agree that within a 
decade, if not earlier, Iran will have a functioning 
nuclear weapon and delivery: system.'3 Iran is 
reportedly working on developing IRBMs to 
extend its reach into Europe and Asia and even 
ICBMs for potential use against the United States 
itself.74
Almost all speculation and analysis concerning 
Iranian capabilities has focused on the Middle 
East and Europe, ignoring the impact of Iranian 
nuclearization on Central Asia or the Caucasus. A 
nuclear Iran with unresolved but long-smoldering 
domestic struggles, thinking that it can deter 
resistance, could well be tempted into foreign 
policy adventures to achieve domestic aims and 
aggrandize its influence abroad. While Russia and 
China have been among the main supports of
73 James Risen and Judith Miller, “CIA Tells 
Clinton an Iranian A-Bomb Can’t Be Ruled Out,” New York 
Times, January 17, 2000, p. 1; Associated Press, February' 29, 
2000.
74 FBIS UMA, 98-075, March 17, 1998.
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Iran’s nuclearization, quite possibly neither 
government might view Iranian and/or Pakistani 
nuclearization positively, given the repercussions 
in Xinjiang and Central Asia. Such factors should 
give us a sense of how the rest of Asia might be 
affected by Iranian nuclearization.
Neglect of Central Asian threat scenarios if 
Iran gains nuclear capabilities is pardy attributable 
to the fact that the pace, direction, and extent of 
Iran's overall rearmament and acquisition of 
weapons of mass destruction gready depends 
upon foreign sales or transfers. Because of 
constant U.S. and other pressure that is exerted 
upon Russia and other providers it will be 
difficult, if not impossible to forecast what Iran's 
capabilities will be, how much of any single 
capability it will have, and when it gains those 
capabilities.
Iran's numerous and well-known difficulties in 
maintaining and servicing its existing weapons 
systems or in obtaining parts for aging U.S. 
systems also precludes easy assumptions 
concerning the pace, direction, timing, and extent 
of future Iranian military power and strategy7. Iran 
also may not have thought deeply about the 
strategic potentials and possible missions it will 
confront once it reaches the point of acquiring 
usable WMD. Nevertheless, Iran clearly seeks 
both regional hegemony and to avail itself of a 
credible deterrent capability primarily against those 
states it identifies as an actual or potential threat, 
Israel, Iraq, and the United States.
Will Iran use it to attempt nuclear blackmail 
against a Transcaucasian and/or Central Asian 
state? Will the United States or some other great 
power be able to extend its deterrence against Iran 
to that threatened state, and if so how? After all, 
in almost all these states there are actual or 
potentially secessionist ethno-religious or political 
minorities which Iran can use to destabilize the 
target state. If Lebanon is an example, the further 
away the target state is from Iran, the bolder Iran 
is in extending military7, political, intelligence, and 
economic support to groups like Hezballah. The 
Transcaspian’s unsettled situations already7 present 
tempting opportunities for engaging in such 
policies. Although Iran has hitherto been very7 
circumspect, if it has a functioning and viable 
deterrent it might use one or more of these
minorities, as it has used Hezballah, and even 
threaten the state that seeks to undertake reprisals 
against them with extended deterrence on behalf 
of its “clients.”
Will possession of usable nuclear weapons 
therefore lead Iran to support secessionist 
minorities elsewhere in the region in the belief that 
even other nuclear states are deterred by its 
capability? There are precedents for this that go 
beyond Lebanon. For example, Pakistan 
apparently7 employs a similar logic in its incitement 
of conflicts in Kashmir. Undoubtedly such 
concerns are warranted as no Central Asian state 
has truly secure borders or legitimacy7 and they all 
face real threats of ethnic secessionist wars that 
could draw in larger powers. Indeed, Iran 
constantly worries about Azerbaijan reuniting with 
Iranian Azerbaijan. If one adds a nuclear power 
to the ethnopolitical mix, regional security issues 
will become more complex and harder to resolve.
Indeed, Iran and Russia might part ways if 
Iran's nuclear capability becomes perceived as a 
threat to Russia. Alternatively7 Irano-Pakistani 
rivalry in Afghanistan might lead Iran to play7 a 
secessionist card against either Moscow or 
Islamabad in the belief of its essential 
invulnerability to serious retribution. If any of 
those rivalries grow over time, Iran's nuclear 
potential would exert considerable influence upon 
Central Asia. Inasmuch as many analysts concur 
that possession of nuclear weapons makes the 
world safe for conventional warfare, the 
temptation to use such weapons to assert Iranian 
objectives in Central Asia or the Transcaucasus 
might prove too strong to resist.
Neither does the scenario of a more aggressive 
Iran, and not only in the Gulf and Middle East, 
stop with these questions. We can already7 see Iran 
becoming a “second-tier” proliferator to other 
states. Since Pakistan had assisted Iraq's fledgling 
nuclear program, so might Iran decide to become 
an international proliferator and exporter.'3 Iran 
and its potential partners could constitute two 
simultaneous fronts against American or some 
other power in widely7 separated theaters to deter *
75 This point is based on conversations with Daniel 
Goure of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, D.C., April 2000.
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U.S. or allied intervention and could make the 
mutual proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction the basis of their own coalitional 
activities.
Until now Central Asian states have 
successfully avoided nuclear entanglements and 
created a nuclear free zone with great power 
support from Moscow and Beijing. But will a 
nuclear Iran agree to tliis nuclear weapons free 
zone? And if it does not, what will then happen to 
that zone and what pressures might be unleashed 
within Central Asia or the CIS as a whole, or 
South Asia to react to Iran’s accretion of power?
Likewise, we cannot know what the ultimate 
configuration of Iranian forces will be or what 
kind of doctrine it will choose. India’s recently 
published nuclear doctrine speaks of a stable 
deterrent and second-strike capability, language 
that strongly implies it is moving towards a large, 
robust nuclear force with a triad of land-, sea-, and 
air-based deliver}' systems or missiles for those 
weapons.76 India is also apparently starting down 
the road of ballistic missile defenses to preserve its 
deterrent’s credibility and is greatly expanding its 
space program to provide for a potential 
reconnaissance and/or strike capability either in 
space or from earth to space.77
76 Raju G. C. Thomas, “Missile Programs and the 
Indian Nuclear Determent,” Proceedings from the Conference on 
Countering the Missile Threat, Internationa! Military Strategies 
(Washington, D.C.: Jewish Institute for National Security 
Affairs, 1999), 178-80; “Pakistan Tests New Missile and 
Revises Command Structure,” Jane’s Defence WCekly, February 
16, 2000, p. 3; Pravin Sawhney, “flow Inevitable Is an Asian 
‘Missile Race’?” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 2000, pp. SO- 
34; I Iilary Synnott, “The Causes and Consequences of South 
Asia’s Nuclear Tests,” Adelphi Papers, no. 332 (1999):30-34, 
45-46, 53-65.
’ Steven Lee Myers, “Russia Helping India Extend 
Range of Missiles, Aides Say,” New York Times, April 27,
1998, p. 1; Banglaore, Deccan Herald (internet version), in 
English, December 23, 1998, FBIS NES, December 23, 1998; 
Daniel Goure, “WMD and Ballistic Missiles in South Asia,” 
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United States, July 15, 1998, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104'h 
Congress, Appendix 3, Unclassified Working Papers, 1998, 
pp. 151-58; David R. Tanks, “Ballistic Missiles in South Asia: 
Are IBMs a Future Possibility?”, ibid., 317-31; Henry 
Sokolski, “Space Technology' Transfers and Missile- 
Proliferation,” ibid., 303-15; Richard I I. Speier, Testimony 
Before the Subcommittee on International Security' 
Proliferation and Federal Services, Committee on
Iran might conceivably move in the same 
direction and trigger a massive destabilization 
throughout much of Asia. Over time, and if 
Iranian proliferation remains essentially 
unimpeded, a relatively robust, diversified Iranian 
force, complete with second-strike capability and 
aspirations to a missile defense and space weapons 
and/or reconnaissance system might come into 
being. Here again we have not begun to imagine 
what the consequences might be for Transcaspian 
governments, India, Pakistan, or even for Russia 
and China under such circumstances. Certainly 
some thought should be given to these 
possibilities.
Even if the rest of the CIS remains non­
nuclear, Iran’s forthcoming entry into the nuclear 
club will create a third or fourth (including 
Pakistan) regional player in the Transcaspian, 
which has both nuclear weapons and vital strategic 
interests at stake in the region. Is it too much to 
assume that the connection between those two 
phenomena and regional security will grow and 
affect ever}' government in these regions or that 
has important interests there? If nothing else, the 
strategic competition for regional influence will 
probably intensify and the margin for action by 
any one external actor, including the United States, 
which has important energy and security interests 
in these areas, will diminish probably by an 
amount corresponding to the increased complexity 
of regional international interactions.
To the extent that Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus are interlinked with other 
geostrategic zones of importance, South Asia, 
Europe, the CIS, or the Middle East, the spillover 
of conflicts from one region into another can 
create opportunities for the use of nuclear 
weapons as a political or even military instrument 
of policy. Azerbaijani calls for an alliance of 
NATO, Israel and the United States against 
Russia, Greece, Armenia, and Iran exemplifies the 
possibilities that may then arise by mixing up all 
these regions' security agendas into one large 
interconnected crisis.




Current international trends will probably 
continue the processes that are fusing CIS and 
other security agendas. NATO enlargement is the 
greatest manifestation of this fusion of security 
agendas for it brings NATO and the possible use 
of NATO forces closer to the new Middle East. 
And the U.S. unilateral supervision of the Arab- 
Israeli peace process follows close behind in 
importance as a factor bringing Europe and the 
Middle East together while also bypassing Russia. 
Russia’s eclipse as a major power has been the key 
factor that has ensured the relative smoothness of 
these processes. And in Asia the rise of China and 
intensified rivalry in South Asia are also in part 
results of Russia's decline. Hence Moscow’s alarm 
lest its eclipse become permanently inscribed in 
world politics at the very moment when it stands 
revealed as a failed state.
Yet other future threats, not even counting 
these states’ long-enduring structural internal 
pathologies also threaten Transcaspian stability 
and security. The commingling of ethnopolitical 
and religious identities in violent conflicts added 
to possible external support for the insurgents 
immensely complicates efforts to maintain peace 
here and is a convenient instrument in the hands 
of foreign and regional states who see something 
to gain by destabilizing neighboring regimes. 
Therefore, any disturbance of the regional status 
quo provides a basis for bilateral and trilateral 
cooperation among interested governments, 
particularly Russia, China, and India.
While the disturbances of 1999, assassination 
attempts, insurgencies, etc. cannot in and of 
themselves cement a triple alliance among these 
states, certainly "terrorism" and Islamic insurgency 
drives them together and enhances their
propensity to cooperate at American expense. Yet 
it is the regimes that America has supported, e.g., 
Islam Karimov's rule in Uzbekistan, whose 
policies breed and or perpetuate the conditions 
that make turbulence and external cooperation 
among Moscow, Delhi, and Beijing possible.
Moreover, the proximity of Central Asia and 
the Transcaucasus to the centers of the drug trade 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan guarantee that 
funding for insurgency in Central Asia will not 
abate. There are numerous allegations of Chechen 
involvement in the drug trade and for some time 
drug money, gun running, and religious-political 
agitation have marched hand in hand in Pakistan.'8 
Thus when one adds up all the threats to security, 
internal and external, it becomes clear that this 
sacred place will not remain empty. Nor is it likely 
that the internal or external order within and 
among local states will easily remain peaceful. 
Since so many of the players now define their 
Transcaspian interests as vital, it is entirely 
possible that both they and internal insurgents 
may not only come to see the region as a holy one 
but will regard the conflicts they provoke and 
react to as holy ones as well.
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